We study a Condorcet Jury model where voters are driven by both reason (instrumental motives) and passion (expressive motives). We show that arbitrarily small amounts of passion significantly affect equilibrium voting behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Increasing the size of a voting body always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between passion and reason is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit. In that case, large voting bodies are no better than a coin-flip at selecting the correct outcome. Thus, even when adding voters is costless, smaller voting bodies often produce better outcomes.
Introduction
Since 1913, the size of the US House of Representatives has remained fixed at 435 members; this despite the sweeping changes brought on by the Great Depression, two world wars, revolutions in transportation and information technology, as well as a population increase of over 200 million people. 1 One may well wonder why (or whether) 435 is the "right" number.
Indeed, the optimal size of voting bodies is a fundamental question of governance. Whether clan, company, or country, virtually all organizations have to take a position on this issue.
Direct democracy, where the voting body consists of the entirety of the polity, represents one extreme, while autocracy represents the other. Often, neither of these extremes are chosen. Instead, we frequently observe a limited number of representatives acting on behalf of constituents.
In principle, larger sized voting bodies have an informational advantage. While individuals may be poorly informed about the right course of action, collectively, they possess much more information. This argument, which informs the Condorcet jury theorem, offers a powerful rationale for direct democracy. One countervailing force is the cost of coordination:
Larger bodies are more difficult (and perhaps expensive) to manage. Indeed, direct democracy may work for town meetings in New Hampshire, but a "town meeting" of the citizens of New York City is entirely impractical. Another countervailing force is the dwindling of members' informedness as the size of the voting body grows: Either the marginal individual is progressively less informed, or everybody's incentives to acquire information become attenuated as the size of the voting body increases. 2 Arguably, advances in information technology have relaxed both of these constraints.
The cost of becoming informed has declined significantly and individuals need no longer be physically present to confer on decisions. As these constraints fall away, it would seem 1 When Alaska and Hawaii were first admitted to the Union, there were, temporarily, 437 representatives. 2 See, for example, Karotkin and Paroush (2002) .
that direct democracy becomes more attractive, and that we should strive to move in that direction.
James Madison, for one, would have begged to differ. In Federalist No. 58 he pointedly observed that "the more numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendancy of passion over reason." Madison understood reason to mean caring for the public interest, while passion represented more parochial concerns that were narrow, immediate, and personal. (See Strahan, 2003 ). Madison's point was that, even absent coordination problems or informational considerations, limiting the size of a voting body was essential for its effective functioning.
In this paper, we study the interplay of "passion" and "reason" with the size of the voting body and analyze its effect on the quality of decision making. To illustrate the principal forces at work, we consider a setting of pure public interest-voters share the same objective in deciding on the correct course of action. However, each voter is only imperfectly informed about which action is the right one. In this sense, the setting is that of a classic Condorcet jury model. Were voters purely animated by reason then, under majority rule, a large voting body would almost surely produce the correct outcome. But voters in our model are not animated by reason-i.e., instrumental motives-alone. Passion also plays a role. Specifically, we suppose that each voter also derives a direct, non-instrumental payoff from voting in a particular way, regardless of the outcome of the vote. These payoffs may derive from a voter's norms, identity, self image, or ideology. Or they may simply derive from the need to pander to his or her constituents. Regardless, voters have expressive as well as instrumental motives. We allow the weight placed on expressive motives (passion) to be arbitrary-passion may play a small role or a large one.
Our first result confirms Madison's intuition: Regardless of the weight placed on passion, once the voting body grows sufficiently large voting will be based on passion alone; i.e., voting is purely expressive. By contrast, when the voting body is small, voters subject to these same passions will act according to reason; i.e., voting is purely instrumental. More broadly, the passion element of voting increases with the size of the body.
Being antithetical to the public good, passion was something to be guarded against in
Madison's view. In our model, the relation between passion and the public good is more nuanced. If passions are sufficiently malleable (i.e., informed and influenced by facts), purely expressive voting can still produce good outcomes. That is, a large voting body will take the correct decision despite the fact that no one is voting instrumentally. When passions are relatively impervious to facts, however, Madison's pessimism proves justified. In that case, a large voting body produces welfare minimizing decisions.
It might seem that the governance question is now relatively simple to answer: Make voting bodies as large as possible when passions are malleable, and keep them small when they are not. In fact, this would be a mistake. Even when passions are malleable such that, in the limit, large voting bodies take the right decisions, there is always a (potentially large) region where increasing the size of the body leads to worse decisions. That is, for intermediate-sized voting bodies, informational gains from adding more voters can be swamped by informational losses from more expressive voting.
It is useful to contrast our findings with standard voting models where preferences are purely instrumental. By and large, these models present a hopeful picture of decision making by large voting bodies. For instance, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) offer a quite general model where large bodies almost always take the right decision. A key insight from our model is that adding even arbitrarily small amounts of "passion" can dramatically alter these positive conclusions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first place our findings in the context of the extant literature. Section 2 then sketches the model. Section 3 characterizes pure strategy equilibria, while section 4 provides a complete equilibrium characterization.
Section 5 studies the quality of decision making as the size of the voting body grows. Finally, section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
Related Literature
The notion that voters must be motivated by considerations other than the purely instrumental dates back to, at least, Downs (1957 voting. Unlike much of the previous literature, our concern is not with turnout but with the optimal size of voting bodies.
Our focus on expressive preferences builds closely on Fiorina (1976), Brennan and Buchanan (1984) and Brennan and Lomasky (1993) . All of these seminal publications present an intuitive analysis of the effect of expressive motives on voting behavior and outcomes. In our view, this work has not received the consideration it deserves in the field of economics, perhaps because of the lack of a fully developed, formal mathematical model. A contribution of our paper is to fill this gap by providing a formal model of voting with mixed motives. Our paper also contributes to the vast literature on information aggregation in voting.
The polar case of our model where expressive motives are completely absent is a special case of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) . That paper, as well as Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) ,
shows that a version of the Condorcet jury theorem holds quite generally-large elections succeed in aggregating information. 4 However, these results assume that preferences are purely instrumental.
Finally, our concern with the optimal size of voting bodies connects to the literature on the optimal design of committees (see, e.g., Persico, 2004 , and references therein). This literature is mainly concerned with incentives for information acquisition and the effects of communication on outcomes. We abstract away from these considerations, instead focusing on how non-instrumental preferences affect the optimal size of voting bodies.
Model
We study a simple model of voting where voters are driven both by reason (instrumental preferences) and by passion (expressive preferences), and where information aggregation is a primary consideration. Suppose that there are two equally likely states, labeled θ ∈ {α, β}, and a simple-majority vote with two possible outcomes, o ∈ {A, B}. Each of n + 1 voters, where n is even, receives a conditionally independent signal, s ∈ {a, b}. With probability
, 1 a voter receives a "true" signal-i.e., an a signal when the state is α and a b signal when the state is β. Otherwise, the voter receives a "false" signal, defined in analogous fashion.
A voter's payoffs are determined by the outcome of the vote, o, the underlying state, θ, and his individual vote v, v ∈ {A, B}. Outcome A is objectively better in state α, while outcome B is better in state β. Specifically, all voters receive a payoff of 1 if the better outcome is selected and a payoff of 0 if the worse outcome is selected. We shall refer to this aspect of a voter's payoffs as his instrumental payoffs. Voters also derive direct payoffs from voting in a particular way. This payoff is independent of the outcome of the vote and depends solely on whether one's individual vote conforms to some norm (passion). This payoff may be intrinsic, i.e., derive from how voting a certain way affects one's self image, or it may be extrinsic: A representative may have to explain his vote to constituents back home. Regardless, voting in a fashion consistent with one's norms (passions) yields a payoff of 1, while casting a vote against one's norms yields a payoff of zero. We shall refer to this aspect of a voter's payoffs as his expressive payoffs. Finally, let ε denote the relative weight a voter places on expressive payoffs, while complementary weight is placed on instrumental payoffs.
Next, we turn to how norms are determined. Suppose that, ex ante, norms are such that, with probability ρ ≥ 1 2
and independently across voters, a given voter views voting for A as normative. 5 After the state has been realized and the voter has received his signal, his view about the appropriate norm might change. Specifically, we suppose that with probability q ∈ [0, 1) and independently across voters, a voter is influenced by his new information and adopts a norm consistent with his (posterior) beliefs about which outcome is more likely to be superior. Thus, with probability q, a voter receiving an a signal adopts voting for A as the norm while, with the same probability, a voter receiving a b signal adopts voting for B as the norm. With the complementary probability 1 − q, the voter sticks to his ex ante norm.
One can think of q as representing the propensity of norms to be influenced by the facts.
Formally, a voter's norm is summarized by his type t, t ∈ {A, B}. An A type receives an expressive payoff from voting for A, while a B type receives an expressive payoff from voting for B. With probability q and independently across voters, a voter's type is determined by his signal; i.e., an a signal induces type A, while a b signal induces type B. With probability 1−q a voter's type is not influenced by his signal, such that his type and signal are uncorrelated.
In that case, the voter's type is A with probability ρ.
To summarize, a voter with type t who casts a ballot v in a vote that produces outcome 5 Assuming ρ ≥ Voters cast their ballots simultaneously and the outcome of the vote is decided by majority rule. When determining equilibrium voting behavior, we restrict attention to symmetric responsive strategies that are undominated. An equilibrium is then characterized by the voting behavior of each kind of voter, i.e., voters with signals s ∈ {a, b} and types t ∈ {A, B}.
Absent expressive preferences (which corresponds to ε = 0), the model is quite standard and easy to analyze. In that case, in equilibrium, voters vote according to their signals and, for large n, the probability that the correct outcome is selected converges to one. 6 We may divide voters into four classes depending on the realizations of s and t. When s and t coincide-i.e., s = a and t = A, or s = b and t = B-we say that a voter is unconflicted.
When s and t differ, we say that a voter is conflicted. After some simplification, it may be readily shown that the probability of a voter being conflicted is equal to 1 2 (1 − q). Notice that, when q = 1, type and signal are perfectly correlated and, as a consequence, there are no conflicted voters. As q falls, the probability that a voter is conflicted increases and reaches a maximum of 50% at q = 0. Thus, conflicted voters are always a minority in the voting population.
We now turn to voting strategy. Let γ α denote the equilibrium probability that a randomly chosen voter casts a vote for A in state α. Likewise, let γ β denote the probability of an A vote in state β. We first show that voting for unconflicted voters is straightforward-they simply cast a vote consistent with both their signal and their type. Formally,
Lemma 1
In all symmetric responsive equilibria, unconflicted voters vote according to their type and signal.
The voting behavior of conflicted voters is considerably more complex and interesting.
Before proceeding with an equilibrium characterization, it is useful to define strategies more formally. Let σ s denote the probability that a conflicted voter with signal s votes for A.
From Lemma 1 it follows that
Note that γ β < γ α for all σ a and σ b . That is, A receives a greater (expected) share of the vote when it is the superior option than when it is the inferior option. The same is true for 
, and
Intuitively, differences in instrumental payoffs arise only when the vote is tied. They reflect the balance between tilting the vote toward the correct outcome given the signal, versus tilting the vote toward the incorrect outcome. Expressive payoff differences, on the other hand, always arise. Here, the term 
Equilibrium Voting in Pure Strategies
Having characterized the equilibrium voting behavior of unconflicted voters, we now turn to the behavior of conflicted voters. As we show below, the equilibrium voting behavior of conflicted voters typically varies with the size of the voting body. Intuitively, as the size of the voting body grows, instrumental considerations-which hinge on the probability of being pivotal-become less important and voting becomes more expressive.
While n + 1 denotes the discrete size of the voting body, it is sometimes convenient to use a continuous analog of n, which we denote by m. We also adapt the usual floor/ceiling notation for the integer parts of m to reflect the restriction that n be an even number.
Specifically, let m denote the largest even integer less than or equal to m, and let m denote the smallest even integer greater than or equal to m. We use the Gamma function to extend factorials to non-integer values. Recall that, for integer values, n! = Γ (n + 1) and, hence,
. The expression
represents the continuous analog. This makes the function V s and other expressions well-defined for all non-negative real values of m. For instance,
We now offer a useful technical lemma which shows that, for fixed values of z α and z β , V s is monotone in m. Formally,
. Then
is strictly decreasing in m. Moreover, lim m→∞ Φ (m) ↓ 0.
Instrumental Equilibrium
From an information aggregation perspective, it would be ideal if voters simply voted in line with their signals. As we have shown above, this is not a problem for unconflicted voters. For conflicted voters, whether to vote instrumentally turns on whether the gains from voting instrumentally and improving the probability of breaking a tie in the right direction outweigh the losses from voting against one's expressive preferences.
Let z I α denote z α under instrumental voting and note that z
Lemma 2 implies that the benefits from instrumental voting are strictly decreasing in m.
Thus, finding the largest size voting body for which instrumental voting is an equilibrium simply amounts to determining the value of m such that
Lemma 2 also implies that for all m > 0,
Hence, a necessary condition for instrumental voting to be an equilibrium for some size of the voting body is that The Proposition says that, for large voting bodies, instrumental voting is not an equilibrium. Since the probability of being pivotal declines as the number of voters increases, the effective weight of instrumental payoffs, which depends on the chance of a tied election, declines relative to the effective weight of expressive payoffs. Once voters are sufficiently unlikely to swing the vote, they are better off voting according to their type and locking in the ε expressive utility, rather than voting according to their signal and foregoing this sure gain for a lottery with only a small chance of success.
Inspection of equation (3) reveals thatm I does not depend on q and ρ. That is, the size of the voting body for which instrumental voting is an equilibrium is independent of the rate of conflict between instrumental and expressive motives and the level of ex ante bias in expressive motives. Also, the maximal size of the voting body for which instrumental voting is an equilibrium varies non-monotonically with the quality of voters' information. When voters are poorly informed, i.e., r < , instrumental voting is never an equilibrium.
However, as voters become perfectly informed, i.e., r → 1,m I also goes to zero. There are two different forces at work here. When r is low, a voter is relatively likely to be pivotal but unlikely to push the outcome in the right direction with his vote; hence expected instrumental payoffs are low. When r is high, a voter is very likely to push the outcome in the right direction conditional on being pivotal, but very unlikely to be pivotal. Again, this leads to low expected instrumental payoffs. Thus, the size of the voting body for which instrumental voting is an equilibrium is largest when voters are moderately well-informed.
If the weight on expressive payoffs is small, the fact that instrumental voting is not an equilibrium for voting bodies with more than m I members might seem of no consequence.
Indeed, inspection of equation (3) reveals thatm I becomes infinitely large as ε goes to zero.
However, a key question is how fastm I grows as ε shrinks. Whilem I does not have a closedform solution, Stirling's approximation offers a way to examine the relationship betweenm I and ε.
Remark 1 For small ε,
where W (·) is the Lambert W function. 
2 , where ξ is a scaling factor independent of k. Now recall
Hence, we can conclude thatm I,k grows only at rate 2 ln k as ε k falls.
In other words, whilem I,k increases, it does so only extremely slowly.
Example 1 Suppose that r = 
, and let z E β be likewise defined. It may be readily verified that z
Therefore,
Thus, we need only check the incentive condition for expressive voting for voters with b signals.
Because z 
Assumption 1 together with Lemma 2 guarantees that equation (5) has a unique solution, which we denote by m E . 8 Hence, m E is the smallest size voting body such that always voting according to one's type is an equilibrium. Formally, Proposition 2 Expressive voting is an equilibrium iff n ≥ m E .
One might have thought that m E =m I , i.e., once instrumental voting ceases to be an equilibrium, expressive voting becomes an equilibrium. Notice, however, that this is generically not the case. This is most easily seen for q = 0. In that case, equation (5) reduces to
Lemma 2 implies that m E <m I for ρ > r, whereas m E >m I for ρ < r. Hence, instrumental and expressive equilibria may overlap, or there may be a gap between the two. The gap 8 While m E does not admit a closed-form solution, a good approximation is available:
2 betweenm I and m E can be quite large indeed. To see this, let us return to the example above, filling in the remaining parameters of the model. Example 2 Suppose that r = 3/5, ρ = 7/10, q = 7/10, and ε = 1/50. Then, instrumental voting is an equilibrium for n + 1 ≤ 23, while expressive voting is an equilibrium for n + 1 ≥
459.
This leaves open the question of what happens in between instrumental and expressive voting. The next section fills in this gap by considering mixed strategies.
Full Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we allow for mixed strategies and characterize all equilibria. The following lemma lets us narrow down the kinds of conflicted voter behavior that can arise in equilibrium. 
We are now in a position to determine the bounds for which such a completely mixed equilibrium exists. The lower bound corresponds to the largest size voting body for which instrumental voting is an equilibrium. The upper bound,m CM , is the unique m that solves
Furthermore, in the region for which a completely mixed equilibrium exists, it is unique. Formally, Proposition 4 A completely mixed equilibrium exists iff n is such thatm I < n <m CM .
For each such n, there exists exactly one mixed-strategy equilibrium. Moreover,m CM >m I .
Since there exists a unique completely mixed equilibrium for every n in the interval m I < n <m CM , we can define a sequence of completely mixed equilibria, with n running from m I < n < m CM . Note that this sequence is fully characterized by the sequence of mixing probabilities {{σ a , σ b } n } m I <n< m CM . We say that voting becomes more expressive if σ a decreases and σ b increases. We now show that To analyze partially mixed equilibria and, thereby, give a full characterization of equilibrium for all n, it is convenient to distinguish between two cases: equilibrium when the rate of conflict between types and signals is high, and when it is low. We shall say that conflict is low when q > q * , where q * is defined below. This corresponds to the case where norms and passions are relatively malleable, such that instrumental and expressive motives tend to coincide. Conflict is high when q < q * . We show that for low conflict, there always exists a unique equilibrium for each n. For high conflict, there may be multiple equilibria for some n.
Multiplicity can occur both within an equilibrium class, as well as across equilibrium classes.
For example, two different partially mixed equilibria may coexist for the same n while, at the same time, there also exists an expressive equilibrium.
Uniqueness turns on the monotonicity of
is increasing in σ b at σ b = 1 and m = m E , then equilibrium is unique for every n.
Formally, q * is defined as the (unique) value
where m E (q) reflects the dependence of m E on the degree of conflict. We now show that Lemma 4 q * exists and is unique. Furthermore, q 0 < q * < q 1 , where q 0 = .
The bounds on q * are useful in two ways. First, while q * does not admit a closed form solution, the bounds are easily calculated. Second, and more importantly, q 1 is intimately connected with information aggregation, as we will show in Section 5.
Low Conflict
In this section we prove that, when conflictedness is low, i.e., q > q * , there is a unique equilibrium for every n. Moreover, as n increases, equilibrium moves smoothly from instrumental to expressive voting. When a voting body is small, instrumental voting is the unique equilibrium. As the voting body grows larger, equilibrium voting becomes completely mixed.
As it grows larger yet, we move to partially mixed voting. That is, voters with a signals vote expressively while voters with b signals continue to mix; however the latter are increasingly likely to vote expressively. Finally, in sufficiently large voting bodies, expressive voting is the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 3 implies that only partially mixed equilibria remain to be analyzed. When
and largest when (σ a , σ b ) = (0, 1). By arguments analogous to those establishing the bounds on completely mixed equilibria, these facts together with Lemma 2 imply that Proposition 6 Under low conflict, a partially mixed equilibrium exists iff n is such that m CM ≤ n < m E . For each n, there exists exactly one partially mixed equilibrium. Moreover,
Since there is a unique partially mixed equilibrium for everym CM ≤ n < m E , we can define a sequence of such equilibria, with n running from m CM to m E . Note that this sequence is fully characterized by the sequence of mixing probabilities {{σ b } n } m CM <n< m E .
We now show that the partially mixed equilibrium becomes more expressive as n increases.
Formally,
Proposition 7
In the partially mixed equilibrium sequence, as n increases, voting becomes more expressive.
Summary Note that, when conflict is low, the intervals for which the various classes of equilibria exist partition the set of even integers. Moreover, as equilibrium within each class is unique for every n, we have shown that Proposition 8 When conflictedness is low, there exists a unique equilibrium for each n. As equilibrium is unique for each n, we can define an infinite equilibrium sequence, C 0 .We have seen before that, within each equilibrium class, voting becomes (weakly) more expressive as n increases. Moreover, it is easily verified that voting also becomes more expressive when we move from one equilibrium class in C 0 to the next. Hence, we have shown that Proposition 9 Under low conflict, equilibrium behavior becomes more expressive when n increases.
Finally, let us return to Example 2. Because q = 
High Conflict
We now turn to the case where conflict between types and signals is high, i.e., q < q * . As we shall see, this makes equilibrium behavior more complex. While the classes of equilibria are the same as under low conflict, under high conflict, the ranges for which these classes exist may overlap. Indeed, an instrumental and an expressive equilibrium may coexist for the same value of n. Moreover, equilibrium may no longer be unique within a class: For generic parameter values, two different partially mixed equilibria coexist.
We will show that the end point,m P M , of partially mixed voting is the largest value of m such that the indifference condition for conflicted voters with a b signal still has a solution in σ b . That is,m
Denote that solution by σ b,m P M . Under low conflict, we saw that V b | σa=0 was increasing in σ b . This guaranteed two things:
(1) there was a unique partially mixed equilibrium and (2) If we trace out their sequences as a n increases, the two partially mixed equilibria converge to one another and coincide at their common endpointm P M .
At the upper boundm P M for partially mixed voting, expressive voting already is an equilibrium since, away from its peak, V b | σa=0 must already be negative at σ b = 1. This is the intuition for the following lemma, which provides sufficient conditions for expressive voting to overlap with partially mixed voting.
Lemma 5m P M exists and is unique. Moreover, for q ≤ q 0 , m E <m P M .
We are now in a position to fully characterize equilibrium under high conflict.
Proposition 10 When conflictedness is high (i.e., q < q * ) equilibrium is:
Moreover, within each sub-class, the equilibrium is unique.
While, typically, expressiveness increases with the size of the voting body, the sequence of high partially mixed equilibria has the somewhat counter-intuitive property that expressiveness decreases with n. Whenm P M and m E do not coincide (as is the case for q ≤ q 0 ), then, for m E ≤ n <m P M , equilibria 4) and 5) coexist with one of the equilibria 1), 2), and 3). In particular, for some parameter values and voting body sizes, instrumental and expressive equilibria coexist. To see this, consider the following amendment of Example 2, where we have reduced q from 7/10 to 1/10.
Example 3 Suppose that r = 3/5, q = 1/10, ρ = 7/10, and ε = 1/50. Then, instrumental voting is an equilibrium for n+1 ≤ 23, while expressive voting is an equilibrium for n+1 ≥ 19.
There is a completely mixed equilibrium for 25 ≤ n+1 ≤ 43, a low partially mixed equilibrium for 45 ≤ n + 1 ≤ 549, and a high partially mixed equilibrium for 21 ≤ n + 1 ≤ 549.
Expressive Preferences and the Probability of Being Pivotal Once the probability of casting a decisive vote falls sufficiently, expressive motives completely crowd out instrumental motives. Hence, one might suspect that, in our model, pivotality considerations play a subordinated role more generally. This, however, is not the case. Figure 1 illustrates the probability of casting the pivotal vote in Example 3. While the probability of being pivotal falls rapidly under instrumental voting when n increases, it is constant under completely mixed voting. 10 It then falls slowly under partially mixed voting, but remains stubbornly high. 11 As the figure indicates, the probability of casting a decisive vote under partially mixed voting stays above 1.7%, even when n + 1 is as high as 549. As a comparison, when ε = 0 (i.e., under purely instrumental preferences), the chance of being pivotal at n + 1 = 549 is 2.8 × 10 5 times smaller. Beyondm P M only expressive voting is an equilibrium and the chance of being pivotal falls discontinuously to, essentially, zero.
The large difference in pivot probabilities between ε > 0 and ε = 0 does not depend on high rates of conflict. To see this, note that in Example 2 the pivot probability under partially mixed voting at n E + 1 = 459 is again 1.7%, while the pivot probability under ε = 0 is 1.9 × 10 4 times smaller. 10 Indeed, recall from Lemma 3 that the probability of being pivotal in the completely-mixed equilibrium is equal to 1 2r−1 ε 1−ε . 11 It can be shown that the probability of being pivotal in the low and high partially-mixed equilibria converges to 
The Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
Having fully characterized the set of equilibria, we are now in a position to address our main question: What is the optimal size of a voting body? As we saw, Madison's view that larger voting bodies lead to the ascendancy of passion over reason proved to be correct-as the size of a voting body increases, generally, voting becomes more expressive (i.e., passion-based).
Thus, the key trade-off is between the informational gain from adding an additional voter versus the informational loss from more expressive voting. Implicit in Madison's argument against direct democracy is the notion that, at some point, the latter effect dominates the former.
Our preferred metric for evaluating the size of voting bodies is selection accuracy, S. That is, the probability that the correct outcome is chosen given the state. Fix an equilibrium γ α , γ β for a voting body of size n + 1. In state α, the equilibrium probability that an individual voter votes for the correct outcome is γ α . Therefore, the probability that the voting body selects the correct outcome is
In state β, the equilibrium probability that an individual voter votes for the correct outcome is 1 − γ β . Thus, the voting body selects the correct outcome with probability
Since the two states are equally likely, S (n + 1) = Low Conflict Suppose the rate of conflict is low; i.e., q > q * . In that case, there is a unique equilibrium for each size voting body and, thus, S (n + 1) is uniquely determined. Once the voting body becomes sufficiently large, voting is purely expressive. Beyond this point, there is no more trade-off between information and expressiveness. As only the informational force persists, it would seem that information should aggregate in the limit.
What is the informational effect of a marginal voter when voting is purely expressive? In state α, the chance that a voter votes for the correct outcome is γ . This means that the marginal voter always improves accuracy in state α. In state β, the chance that a voter votes for the correct outcome is
. In that case, the marginal voter improves accuracy if and
. Hence, the threshold value of q such that the informational contribution is positive in state β is q > = q 1 -the bound we identified earlier as being sufficient (but not necessary) for equilibrium uniqueness. Therefore, in the limit, the probability of selecting the correct outcome in state α always goes to one, while the probability in state β goes to one if and only if q > q 1 . 12 We have shown
Proposition 11
In large voting bodies, information fully aggregates if and only if conflict is very low; i.e., q > q 1 .
What happens when conflict is not very low, i.e., q < q 1 ? Because γ , γ E α is farther from 1 2 than is 1 − γ E β . This means that the incremental voter is more likely to break a tie correctly in state α than he is to break a tie incorrectly in state β. It also means that the probability of a tie is greater in state β than in state α. When n is small, tie probabilities are relatively similar and, hence, adding a voter is beneficial. When n is large, however, ties are vastly more likely in state β and, thus, the marginal voter has a negative effect on accuracy. In the limit, the correct outcome is chosen with probability one in state α, but is never chosen in state β. As a result, accuracy falls to 50%. Formally,
Proposition 12
Suppose conflict is not very low; i.e., q < q 1 . Then, for n sufficiently large, the incremental voter has negative informational value. That is, S (n + 1) is eventually decreasing in n. Furthermore, in the limit, large voting bodies are no better than a coin flip at selecting the correct outcome. It now might seem that, when conflict is very low, the best strategy is to always make the voting body as large as possible. Indeed, when n is sufficiently large, incremental voters have positive informational value and, hence, locally, their addition is unambiguously helpful. For smaller values of n, however, the trade-off between information and expressiveness is present, When q * < q < q 1 , the equilibrium is unique but information does not aggregate. ). Specifically,
Proposition 13
Accuracy is always strictly decreasing in the region of the completely mixed equilibrium.
Formally, for m I < n <m CM , S (n + 1) is strictly decreasing in n.
To illustrate the potential importance of this effect, we offer an example where the "valley" of larger voting bodies producing lower accuracy is considerable. Suppose that we amend Example 3 to remove any asymmetry in ex ante norms, i.e., ρ = 1/2. Since
equilibrium is unique for every n, and accuracy converges to 1 in the limit.
As Figure 2 illustrates, increasing the number of voters is not the same as increasing accuracy. While accuracy increases along the instrumental equilibrium sequence (up to n + 1 = 23), it falls for n + 1 between 25 and 61. Beyond this point, welfare once again increases, but it only reaches its previous high water mark at n + 1 = 2, 429. The region of decreasing accuracy corresponds to voting body sizes where there is only a completely mixed equilibrium. Here, the informational losses from more expressive voting outpace the informational gains from the increased number of voters. The region from n+1 = 61 onwards corresponds to expressive voting. 13 Here, the informativeness of votes no longer degenerates when n increases and, since q > q 1 , additional votes improve equilibrium accuracy, albeit slowly. The point is that, even when conflict is very low, expanding the voting body is not necessarily conducive to obtaining better policies.
High Conflict When conflictedness is high, i.e., q < q * , equilibrium multiplicity complicates the determination of the optimal size of voting bodies. Specifically, accuracy will depend on which equilibrium is selected. Amending our notation for accuracy, let S η (n + 1)
denote the selection accuracy of an equilibrium of type η ∈ {I, CM, LP M, HM P, E} when the size of the voting body is n + 1. Here, I, CM , LP M , HMP , E denote instrumental, completely mixed, low partially mixed, high partially mixed, and expressive equilibrium, respectively.
For a voting body of a given size, the different types of equilibria can be unambiguously ordered in terms of accuracy.
Lemma 6
If multiple equilibria coexist for given n, then their ranking in terms selection accuracy is:
Lemma 6 is intuitive: The accuracy ranking corresponds to the expressiveness of equilibria. Thus, an expressive equilibrium is least accurate, while an instrumental equilibriumprovided one exists for the same size voting body-is most accurate. Other equilibria are similarly ordered.
It follows immediately from Proposition 12 that, for q < q * , the incremental voter has negative informational value in large voting bodies and, in the limit, voting bodies are no better than a coin flip at selecting the correct outcome. For small voting bodies, on the other 13 When ρ = 1 2 , the partially-mixed equilibrium region disappears as a consequence of the symmetry of the model. While Proposition 14 shows that accuracy falls discontinuously at m P M when equilibrium selection is optimistic, note that, at some point, accuracy must fall discontinuously regardless of the equilibrium selection rule.
To summarize, when conflictedness is high, large voting bodies are undesirable. Smaller bodies do better, but there is a risk that, by experimenting with the size of the voting body, a legislature can experience a sudden drop in its effectiveness (accuracy). This is true even when the legislature is able to always coordinate on the "best" equilibrium.
Minimally Expressive Preferences When expressive preferences are absent, i.e., ε = 0, our model is a standard Condorcet jury model in which information fully aggregates in the limit. On that basis, one might conjecture that, for small ε, large voting body produce outcomes that are approximately optimal. Our final result shows that this is not the case.
Even when the weight on expressive payoffs becomes arbitrarily small, equilibrium accuracy under mixed motives may not approach accuracy under purely instrumental motives as the voting body grows. To see this, fix a sequence ε k → 0. For each element of this sequence, let S ε k denote the asymptotic selection accuracy as n → ∞. For n large, expressive voting is the unique equilibrium. Hence, for every ε k , S ε k = lim n→∞ S E (n + 1). Finally, let S * denote the limit selection accuracy for ε = 0 as n → ∞. It is easy to show that S * = 1. Using
Proposition 11 it then follows that
Proposition 15 Unless conflict is very low, asymptotic accuracy as ε → 0 does not converge to asymptotic accuracy for ε = 0. Formally, if q < q 1 then, for every sequence ε k → 0,
The discontinuity arises from the fact that we consider asymptotic accuracy for fixed ε and then let ε go to zero. If, instead, we took the limit as ε goes to zero for fixed n and then considered the asymptotic accuracy of the vote, accuracy would obviously converge to the case where ε equals zero. That is, information would fully aggregate. However, since our concern is with asymptotic accuracy for small values of ε, the former order of limits is the more appropriate one.
Other Measures of Welfare By using accuracy to determine the optimal size of voting bodies, we implicitly assumed that, from a societal point of view, only the outcome of the vote matters. This, of course, neglects the expressive payoffs of members of the voting body. From the perspective of a constitution designer trying to determine the optimal size of a legislature, this seems sensible. After all, the number of representatives is typically quite small relative to the number of citizens. Moreover, Madison would have argued that expressive payoffs represent "pandering" to parochial interests and, therefore, should not be counted as a benefit in any event.
But even if one chose to include expressive payoffs among the benefits, our conclusions would still remain unaltered. To see this, note that under a pure strategy equilibrium, a voter's expressive payoff is unaffected by the size of the voting body. Hence, accuracy is the sole determinant of welfare. Under a mixed strategy equilibrium, a conflicted voter is indifferent between voting expressively and voting instrumentally. Thus, for purposes of payoff comparison, we may assume that voters vote expressively. Receiving full expressive payoffs, accuracy is then again the sole determinant of a voter's welfare as the size of the voting body changes.
Conclusion
Should a tripling of the US population since 1913 lead to a larger House of Representatives?
Our model suggests that even if it were logistically costless to add new members, and even if each additional representative brought new information to bear on the questions at hand, increasing the number beyond 435 might be a bad idea. The key to this conclusion is the observation that passion rather than reason drives voting behavior in large voting bodies.
By passion we mean payoffs from voting that are divorced from the actual outcome of the vote. These payoffs derive directly from the act of voting in a particular way and are driven by norms, identity, ideology, or simply by the need to pander to constituents. Indeed, in the limit, voting is purely passion-driven, even if voters place only arbitrarily small weight on these non-instrumental, "parochial" concerns.
Whether this is for good or for ill depends on how malleable-influenced by factspassions are. When passions are sufficiently malleable, passionate voting is of no real concern, as it still leads to the correct outcome in the limit. By contrast, when passions are relatively impervious to facts, the passionate voting of large voting bodies produces dismal results.
In the limit, information is driven out entirely and decisions are no better than chance. It 
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider an unconflicted voter with an a signal. Suppose, contrary to the statement of the lemma, that he prefers to vote for B rather than A. That is,
where
First, note that a necessary condition for this inequality to hold is that z β > z α . Second, note that the inequality implies that a conflicted voter with an a signal would also strictly prefer to vote for B, i.e., V a < 0. Furthermore, an unconflicted voter with a b signal would strictly prefer to vote for B. To see this, note that the difference in that voter's payoff in voting for B rather than A is
and this expression is strictly positive, since z β > z α and r > 1 2
.
Finally, a conflicted voter with a b signal would strictly prefer to voter for B since
Hence, we have shown that, if an unconflicted voter with signal a weakly prefers to vote for B, then all voters strictly prefer to vote for candidate B. In turn, this implies that γ α = γ β = 0. This, however, contradicts z β > z α . The proof that an unconflicted voter with a b signal strictly prefers to vote for B is analogous.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Differentiating Φ (m) with respect to m, we obtain
is the xth harmonic number. Note that Φ (m) takes sign of the expression in curly brackets.
is concave in m, the inequality then also holds for all m > 2.
This implies that Φ (m) < 0 iff
And this inequality indeed holds, because r < 1 2 , and z α ≤ z β .
To establish the second part of the lemma, use Stirling's approximation to obtain
for large m. Now note that both terms converge to zero as m → ∞, because z α ≤ z β ≤ We first show that σ a = 1 implies γ α − 1 2
. One may readily verify that for
follows immediately from
is equivalent to showing that γ α − 1 − γ β > 0. After some algebra,
, we have z α < z β and, therefore,
it must be that V a ≥ 0, which implies V b > V a ≥ 0. Thus, conflicted voters with b signals strictly prefer to vote instrumentally, such that σ b = 0. But his is a contradiction, because
Lemma 8 There is no partially mixed equilibrium where σ a ∈ (0, 1), and σ b = 1.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that such an equilibrium does exist. We first show that
The algebra establishing this is straightforward and analogous to that given in the proof of Lemma 7. Since z α < z β , we have V b > V a . Because σ b = 1, it must be that V b ≤ 0, which implies V a < V b ≤ 0. Thus, conflicted voters with a signals strictly prefer to vote expressively, such that σ a = 0. This is a contradiction, because σ a ∈ (0, 1) by assumption.
Lemma 9
There is no partially mixed equilibrium where σ a ∈ (0, 1) and σ b = 0.
The algebra establishing this is straightforward and analogous to that given in the proof of Lemma 7. Since z α > z β , we have V b < V a . Because σ b = 0, it must be that V b ≥ 0, which implies V a > V b ≥ 0. Thus, conflicted voters with a signals strictly prefer to vote instrumentally, such that σ a = 1. This is a contradiction, because σ a ∈ (0, 1)
by assumption.
Proof of Lemma 4:
We prove q 0 < q * < q 1 by showing that: 1) for q ≤ q 0 and m > 0,
2) for q ≥ q 1 and m > 0,
> 0. Existence of q * then follows from continuity
in q and the intermediate value theorem, while the max operator in Equation (6) guarantees uniqueness.
Notice that
which is negative iff q ≤ q 0 . Thus,
< 0 for all m. This establishes 1).
. Thus, Equation (9) > 0, and this establishes 2).
Lemma 10 If σ a = 0 and
Proof. It is sufficient to show that γ α − 1 2
where the first inequality follows from σ b > 1−ρ ρ , the second from ρ ≥ 1 2 , and the third from
follows immediately from the fact that γ β < γ α .
is equivalent to showing that γ α − 1 − γ β > 0. For
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The probability of being pivotal in state θ is Pr [piv|θ] = 
Proof of Proposition 4:
In a completely mixed equilibrium, V a = V b = 0. From Lemma 3 we know that γ α = 1−γ β and, hence, these equalities reduce to
Fact 1: By Lemma 2, the LHS is strictly decreasing in n for fixed γ α . Fact 2: The LHS is strictly decreasing in γ α for fixed n and γ α > .
From Lemma 3 we know that, over the range σ b ∈ 0,
, r , where it is easily verified that
. Facts 1 and 2
imply that the upper bound on voting body sizes for which a completely mixed equilibrium exists,m CM , is the value of m solving Equation
. Similarly, the lower bound is the value of m solving Equation (10) at γ α = r. Notice that this corresponds tom I . Facts 1 and 2 also imply thatm I <m CM . Finally, Fact 2 implies that, for all m ∈ (m I ,m CM ), the completely mixed equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Any completely mixed equilibrium is characterized by the unique value γ * α > 1 2 that solves Equation (10). Lemma 2 implies that the LHS of Equation (10) is decreasing in n and, as a consequence, γ * α must also be decreasing in n.
Hence, in any completely mixed equilibrium, σ a must be decreasing in n, while σ b is increasing in n.
Proof of Proposition 6:
By Lemma 12 (below), in any partially mixed equilibrium, We also claim that
Moreover, Lemmas 10 and 2 imply that V b | σa=0,σ b =1 is strictly decreasing in n. This proves the claim.
From Lemma 13 (below)-which shows that, under low conflict, V b is strictly increasing
-it then follows that for allm CM ≤ n < m E , there exists a unique value
It is straightforward to verify that, at this value of σ b , V a | σ a =0 < 0; hence this constitutes a partially mixed equilibrium.
Finally, we establish thatm
Moreover, from Lemmas 10 and 2 we know that
is strictly decreasing in m. Because, at m E , V b | σ a =0,σ b =1 = 0, this implies that m E >m CM .
Lemma 11
In any partially mixed equilibrium, z α ≤ z β .
Proof. In any partially mixed equilibrium, V a ≤ 0 and V b = 0. This implies that V a +V b ≤ 0, which may be rewritten as n
And this inequality holds iff z α ≤ z β .
Lemma 12
In any partially mixed equilibrium,
Proof. We prove the lemma by showing that σ b < 1−ρ ρ implies z α > z β , which contradicts Lemma 11.
Recall that γ α > γ β . First, we find the value of σ b that makes γ α = and, hence, z α > z β .
Next, we find the value of σ b that makes γ β = imply that the expression in curly brackets is strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 7:
In a partially mixed equilibrium, σ b solves V b | σa=0 (σ b ) = 0. Lemma 10 together with Lemma 2 imply that, for fixed σ b , V b | σ a =0 is strictly decreasing in n. Furthermore, we know from Lemma 13 that, for fixed n and q ≥ q 1 , V b | σa=0 (σ b ) is strictly increasing in σ b . Together, these two facts imply that the equilibrium value of σ b must be strictly increasing in n. As σ a remains constant at zero, voting becomes more expressive when n increases.
Proof of Lemma 5:
By Lemma 14 (below), for q ≤ q 0 , the unique σ b that maximizes V b | σa=0 (σ b ) over the = 0. We will show that at any such point
is single-peaked on σ b ∈ 1−ρ ρ , 1 .
First, the FOC can only be satisfied when 
Now notice that
2 is proportional to .
Proof of Proposition 10:
The proofs of parts (1), (2) , and (4) are identical to those of Propositions 1, 4, 2, respectively. It remains to show that: 1) Low partially mixed voting is an equilibrium iff m CM ≤ n <m P M . 2) High partially mixed voting is an equilibrium iff m E ≤ n <m P M . 3)
If a low, respectively, high partially mixed equilibrium exists, it is unique.
First, the proof of Lemma 5 implies thatm P M constitutes the upper bound on partially mixed voting. Note that Lemma 12 holds independently of q. Thus, we may apply the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 6 to conclude thatm CM is the lower bound for low partially mixed voting. The argument as to why V b | σa=0,σ b =1 < 0 iff n > m E is unchanged from the low conflict case. Thus, we may conclude that m E is the lower bound for high partially mixed voting. Finally, uniqueness follows from Lemma 14.
To prove the proposition, the following lemma is useful. Denote by S γ α , γ β the accuracy of a fixed size voting body when the probability of a vote for A in state α is equal to γ α , while it is equal to γ β in state β.
Lemma 16
Fix γ α ≥ γ β and let 0 ≤ δ < 1 − γ α .
If (γ α + δ) (1 − (γ α + δ)) < 1 − γ β + δ γ β + δ , then
Else, note that γ HP M α
